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THE planners of this conference believed that it might be possible
eventually to formulate more workable standards for government
tax and expenditure decisions by interweaving a search for clarifi-
cation of actual decision processes with a search for workable norms.
In undertaking such a project as they proposed, I am accordingly
pursuing a refinement of normative economics in a roundabout way.
Most of what I have to say will be positive, not normative and, for
that matter, will be more derived from political science than from
traditional economics. The facts to be alluded to are on the whole
familiar. The norms sought are of two kinds: for taxers and spenders
and for designers of decision-making machinery. Glven the purposes
of such Universities-National Bureau conferences as this one, I
take it that in the interpretation of facts, hypotheses will often be
welcome. If at critical points in the argument I fall back on the plea
for additional research, I assume I am within my scholarly rights.
1. Contemporary Practices and Norms
Beginning then with facts, let us take note of some characteristics
of government expenditure and taxation decisions in the United
States, especially in the federal government, that are significant to
economists.'
1. Legislative decisions that authorize expenditures are typically
made without benefit of any formal machinery that brings budgetary
considerations to bear on them. The authorization committees
of the Congress on one hand, and the appropriations committees,
on the other, are relatively independent of each other and not locked
in close cooperation.
2. The costs and benefits of authorized programs are not typically
1Mostof the characteristics of decision making to be listed are familiar.All can
be documented in Arthur Smithies, TheBudgetary Processin the United States, McGraw-
Hill, 1955.
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weighted against each other, systematically and explicitly, when
legislative decisions are made.
3. Policy-making is not systematically and explicitly viewed as a
problem in the choice among alternative means for the achievement
of desired ends. Even in decisions in which the necessity of allocating
scarce funds might appear to make the means-ends problem especially
acute, decision-making is not typically marked by explicit comparison
and deliberate choice among means. The military's penchant for the
"best" of everything—the best planes, the best mess kits, the best
gloves—is coming to be the classic example of reluctance to evaluate
means in the light of ends. Points 2 and 3 are, of course, merely two
aspects of the common failure of government decision-makers to
employ an adequate concept of cost.
4. Some major expenditure or taxation policies are set or altered
as an accident or by-product of other decisions. That is to say, a
policy is not always a decision; it is often simply upon us without
deliberate and explicit choice. A "decision" to run a surplus or deficit
is, for example, often not a decision at all but simply an outcome.
Moregenerally, many of the financial and other implications of
a decision are ignored when a decision is made. The decision-maker,
whether administrator or legislator, permits pressure of work and
limits on his own concerns to confine his attention to less than all
of the important relevant variables.
In the budgetary process, most of us see a partly realized, partly
potential, technique for making expenditure and taxation decisions
more rational. This brief list of characteristics of financial decisions
can be extended to note certain aspects of budgeting.
6. Many major explicitly financial decisions are outside the
budgetary process. Tax decisions are, of course, wholly outside;
so also deficiency appropriations. And in wartime, as might be
expected, appropriations to the military are so generous that avail-
ability of physical supplies, not budgetary considerations,set
expenditure rates.
7. As many economists have noted, there is in the federal budgetary
machinery no explicit provision for coordinating revenues and
expenditures.
8. Formal congressional review of the budget is concentrated in
appropriations subcommittees whose interests are focused on seg-
ments of the budget considered largely in isolation from other seg-
ments.
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9. Neither the appropriations committee as a whole nor the
Congress as a whole gives extended formal consideration to the
budget as a whole, nor does the appropriations committee as a whole
play a strong coordinating role for the subcommittees.
10. Moreover, even in considering segments of the budget, the
subcommittee members are repeatedly drawn into scrutiny of
details rather than of the major expenditure alternatives, although
this phenomenon varies from one subcommittee to another.
11. Being torn between two possibilities—using budgetary scrutiny
for detailed administrative control or using it for planning broad
public policy—legislators are drawn toward the first to a degree
that reduces significantly their explicit attention to the latter.
12. Congress does not enact the budget as a whole at the termina-
tion of budget review but instead enacts a series of appropriations
bills.
13. Budgeting is marked by conflict between President and
Congress, between the two houses of Congress, and among sub-
committees.
Familiar as these provisions are, they are essential to what follows.
The accepted contemporary norms for the budgetary process
reflect widespread dissatisfaction with the characteristics of the
budgetary process just summarized. I would expect widespread
agreement on such a list of norms as the following, taken from
Smithies (page references are to Smithies) though altered somewhat
in emphasis and presentation. Some are norms for taxers and
spenders; some are norms fordesignersof decision-making
machinery. Some are general norms, and some are norms pertaining
to coordination, which is a special aspect of decision making.
1. Governmental objectives should be as clearly and explicitly
defined as possible (25ff.).
2. Alternative policies should be explicitly regarded as alternative
means toward the achievement of objectives (28).
3. Specifically, expenditure decisions should be made explicitly
and deliberately in the light of all of the objectives they are intended
to achieve (16).
4. In the interests of a rational comparison of alternatives, final
expenditures decisions should not be made until all claims on the
budget can be considered (16).
5.Revenueand expenditure decisions should be deliberately
coordinated (192).
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6. For each expediture, some systematic and deliberate appraisal
of benefits and costs should be made (12ff.).
7. Policy-making, including budgetary policy making, should
achieve a unified policy (23).
8. A comprehensive overview of policy-making on expenditures
and revenues should be attempted (16, 25).
9. All taxation and expenditure decisions should be somehow
embraced in the budgetary process (175ff.).
10. Specifically, the legislature should undertake a comprehensive,
unified, rather than segmented, review of the budget (164, 169, 193).
11. Decisions• should be made on the basis of a cooperative
division of function between the legislature and the executive (45).
For present purposes, it does not matter that some of these norms
overlap others and that some are more specific statements of others.
It is important, however, to observe that a few central principles
run through this and similar lists to be found elsewhere in the
literature. In such lists economists reveal themselves as esteeming,
not surprisingly, such conventional principles as:
1. A comprehensive overview of factors relevant to a decision
2. Clarity of definition of social objectives
3. A means-end approach to policy
4. Deliberate and explicit choice among policies
5. A calculation and minimization of cost
6. Reason and cooperation rather than arbitrariness, coercion
and conflict
7. A unified decision-making process for decisions that are highly
interdependent.
Most, perhaps all, of the listed norms are applications in varying
degrees of specificity of these more fundamental principles.
2. Discrepancy Between Practices and Norms
For all the immediate appeal of both norms and underlying
principles, an objection to them is that they do not emerge from a
skeptical analysis of the actual decision-making process, good and
bad, in government but appear instead to be deriyed from a paradigm
of a rational decision process. They stem from criticisms of govern-
ment decision-making that take the form of observations that the
process is not what one would suppose a rational process to be.
Reconsider now in this light the characterizations of decision-
making with which this paper opened. They are invariably read as
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shortcomings of decision-making, although I did not present them
as such. They are thought to be shortcomings, I suggest, not on a
demonstration of their effects but by implicit or explicit appeal
to obvious standards of rationality. Or look again in this light at
the seven underlying principles on which the norms rest. Why are
they as persuasive as they are? Because, again, they represent almost
universally accepted ideas on how to be rational in any kind of
problem-solving.
It is possible that we are all betrayed by these obvious standards
for rational problem-solving. Perhaps they are more limited in
their applicability than we have thought. Although one's ideas of
what is rational suffice to predict that using a milk bottle to drive
spikes into 4 x 4's will ordinarily be inferior to using a hammer,
one cannot be confident for such a complex process as governmental
decision-making that such principles of rationality as compre-
hensiveness of overview, explicitness of choice, means-ends calcu-
lations, and clarity of definition of objectives are appropriate.
These are standards drawn largely from our own intimate experi-
ences with small scale, relatively more simple, problem-solving.
That conventional norms do indeed follow paradigms of rational
processes rather than reflect independent diagnosis of decision-
making and that they may lead us astray can be illustrated. It is a
commonplace norm that revenue and expenditure decisions should'
be coordinated through some formal congressional machinery now
lacking. Why? Because fiscal policy is a powerful device for economic
stabilization, from which it seems "logically" to follow that Congress
should have formal machinery for taking account of the fiscal
consequences of a prospective surplus or deficit. But is it in fact true
that Congress is without methods for coordinating revenue and
expenditure decisions? No, it is only without formally prescribed
procedures, and we should know by now that informal operating
procedures are often superior to formal. And is Congress typically
unaware of a deficit when it occurs? No, except to the degree that
fact-collecting cannot keep up to date in any organization. Do
such deficits and surpluses as do occur (other than those justified by
stability considerations) appear at random? No, they are probably
the result of a combination of congressional attitudes toward fiscal
policy and pressures upon Congress. Do then "economically unwise"
surpluses and deficits demonstrate a need for formal coordination?
No, not unless formal coordination can be shown to be an
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intermediate step to the achievement of changed congressional
attitudes and to the restructuring of pressures on congressmen.
What is it about government decision-making that might make
"obvious" principles of rational choice inappropriate? A first
answer is that complex decision-making is molded by limitations on
human problem-solving capacities not taken account of in the
conventional picture of rational choice.
Consider man's limited capacity to undertake usefully a com-
prehensive overview of the variables relevant to a complex decision.
If sufficiently ambitious, all attempts at a comprehensive overview
run into two major limits: first, man's limited intellectual ability,
that is, his limited ability to grasp, calculate, and remember; and,
second, limited information. Some problems lie so far beyond these
two limits that it would be irrational for man to attempt an informed
and reasoned solution to them; better he flip a coin, adopt a rule of
thumb, or decide by any of several "arbitrary" means.
Commonplace though not trivial decisions as to whether to marry,
what occupation to choose, or how many children to produce are
not so much comprehensively calculated as resolved through a
limited evaluation; or they are drifted into, unthinkingly decided,
taken as by-products of other decisions, or settled by rule of thumb.
While the role of what might be called "reason" in such decisions
°might well be increased for some people in some circumstances,
I see no evidence that these decisions would always be more rational
(unless "rational" is defined as "reasoned") if approached through
an inevitably only partly successful comprehensive overview of the
relevant variables. I would not be so foolish as to make the attempt
myself and did in fact satisfy myself with a very limited view of the
variables.
If these relatively simple personal decisions call for intellectual
capacities and knowledge beyond our reach, all the more so do
complex governmental decisions. The federal budget document runs
to 2,000 pages, and prints of committee hearings on it cover many
thousands more. It is not at all obvious, and indeed doubtful, that
any man or committee can achieve a sufficiently intimate under-
standing of the budget as t9 make the thousands of comparisons and
evaluations required in a genuinely comprehensive overview, even
if these printed materials were all one were required to master.
In fact, of course, one cannot understand the variables relevant
to budgetary decisions without knowing, grasping, remembering,
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and relating to the decisions a prodigious amount of information
about government, the economy, and the wishes of the citizenry.
These difficulties do not mean that men think and express con-
spicuously irrational thoughts when faced with the budget, or that
they flee in panic, or that the budgetary process comes to a grinding
stop. They do mean, however, that most budgetary decisions are in
fact made in ways economists are accustomed to call arbitrary,
that thousands of important comparisons are never in fact made,
that many major issues never come to the attention of decision-
makers, and that such agreement as various decision-makers reach
is less owed to the exhaustiveness of their scrutiny of the budget than
to common ideology, prejudice, or even common ignorance when
they all miss the same relevant issues that might have divided them.
If this is true, as can easily be documented and as I should like
to see documented by research, then it does not at all follow that even
more ambitious attempts at comprehensiveness of overview, as is
conventionally recommended, will increase the elements of rationality
in government taxation and expenditure decisions. It is quite possible
that overtaxing man's limited capacities still further will make the
situation worse.
An objection to this line of argument springs to mind. It is that
limits of man's capacities have been pushed back by dividing up the
decision-making process, that is, by factoring out subdivisions of
the decision tasks. It is true, everyone agrees, that limits on man's
problem-solving capacity can indeed be pushed back by factoring
out parts of problems and enlisting the cooperation of a number of
individuals or groups, each of whom attacks its own assigned part
of the problem. If it were not for this possibility, even the small
federal budgets of earlier decades would have been beyond our grasp.
But pushing back the limits is not the same as eliminating them.
Hence, even with subdivision of the decision-process in the adminis-
tration and in Congress, a $70 billion budget presents a staggering
decision-making problem. Is it not obvious that, even with sub-
division, thousands of important comparisons are not made and
many major issues are not brought to the attention of decision-makers?
We can see why subdivision only pushes back but does not remove
limits by looking at subdivided decision-making processes. Observers
report such familiar difficulties as the following:2 (1) coordination
2Seefor example, Ely Devons, Planning in Practice, Cambridge University Press,
1950.
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of subdivisions is a continuing task of top decision makers; (2)
substantial interdependent elements that cannot be factored out
remain the responsibility of top decision-makers; (3) appropriate
lines of division are unstable, as changing conditions create new
patterns of interdependency;(4)difficulties of communication,
many of which are intended by subordinates, misrepresent to top
decision-makers the facts required for their decisions; (5) motivational
difficulties, illustrated by divergence between organizational goals
as seen by top decision-makers and as seen by subdivisions, inevitably
distort decisions. If this last point is not clear, it predicts, for example,
that appropriations subcommittees take a segmental view of the
budget not only because they lack a strong central coordinating
committee, but also in large part because a subdivision or sub-
committee inevitably on goals and attitudes of its own.
Now, again, these difficulties in subdividing the task of compre-
hensive overview do not mean that decision making becomes
chaotic when subdivided. They simply represent specifications of
limits on man's capacities to carry off successfully a comprehensive
overview of a complex problem. And to return to our main point,
they buttress the allegation that government decision-making is
molded by limits on man's capacities that are not taken account of
in contemporary conventional norms and principles.
Another illustration of the failure of conventional norms and
principles to take sufficient account of the facts is that government
officials often cannot cast a policy problem into a means-ends
framework, as the norms require.
An immediate and obvious difficulty on this score is that decision-
makers, to say nothing of the electorate, do not in fact wholly agree
on objectives or values.3 To be sure, on many they agree roughly;
but the scope of government decision-making is not limited to their
areas of agreement. Nor do men generally aspire to universal agree-
ment on objectives of social policy, prizing instead diversity and
change. Still, it may be questioned, do we not agree that governments
shall take as their working objectives those preferred by the majority?
Do we not consequently enjoy a working agreement on objectives
of governmental policy?
This is a question of fact, and for several reasons the answer is
no. In the first place, it has been shown that majority rule is a process
For present purposes, I shall use interchangeably such terms as "values," "objec-
tives" (including "constraints"), "goals," and "ends."
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through which it is not usually possible for citizens to indicate
preferences on specific policies.4 If a winning candidate differed from
his defeated opponent on, say, an issue in foreign policy (among
other issues that divided them), it does not follow that those who
voted for him favored his stand on the foreign policy issue. Hence,
neither the winning candidate nor anyone else can say what policy
objective is to be taken, by majority rule, as the government's
objective.
Second, most policy choices open to government, including almost
all budgetary choices, are never even raised during electidn cam-
paigns as campaign issues. Again, therefore, a public official is with-
out a clearly defined governmental objective. Third, even in abstract
principle we do not in fact agree on majority rule as abasisof working
agreement. For in a large number of decision-making situations,
citizens differ as to how far the equality principle implicit in majority
rule ought to be compromised to take account of differences in
intensity of preference among citizens and differences in their
circumstances. We have even gone so far in the United States as to
subject some policy decisions to a vote in which only farmers in
particular categories participate. And, of course, the United States
Constitution makes numerous systematic provisions for inequality,
as in it3 basis for representation of senators and the bicameral
legislature. On all these counts, it is clear that government decision-
makers are often without clear instructions from the electrorate on
policy objectives.
At one extreme, the impossibility of a means-end approach to
policy is clear when one decision-maker's mean is another's end.
To one decision-maker or citizen, for example, tax reduction comes
to play such a role in his thinking that we can only call it an end or
objective for him. To another, tax reduction is considered simply as
one of several means to an objective like full employment. A govern-
ment such as ours survives because it takes advantage of agreement
among twO such individuals where it finds it; to require them to
agree with each other on which is end and which is means and then
ask for their agreement on both ends and means is not only to pose
insuperable problems of calculation to them but also to endanger
political stability. The political scientists tell us democracies cannot
be fussy about the terms on which their citizens reach agreement.
R. A. Dahi, A Preface to DemocraticTheory, Universityof Chicago Press, 1956,
pp. 124ff.
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I should like these specific failures of the conventional principles
to take account of the character of government decision-making to
be taken as illustrative of two more general failures that will become
clearer as we move through succeeding stages of the analysis. The
failure to account for man's limited capacities and for the frequent
impossibility of casting a problem into a means-end framework is
sufficient to reveal the possibility that conventional norms and
principles have not taken sufficient account of either (1) the sheer
complexity of government, decision-making or of (2) the. special
problems of values or objectives. Almost any other specific
aspect of decision-making we might have looked into will reveal the
same two underlying problems: complexity and special difficulties
in evaluation.
It was suggested above that our ideas of what is rational in
problem-solving are derived in large part from introspective obser-
vation of our own problem-solving processes from which many of
the complexities of collectivities, including certain value problems,
are absent. In addition, recent new insights into decision-making
carry a powerful bias. With few exceptions, the formal theory of
decision-making has not faced up to the possibility that complexity
can outstrip limited intellectual capacity.5 And thesuccess of
conventional principles in such sophisticated application as operations
research have perhaps tempted us to forget the limited competence
of these applications and the possibility that extremely complex
rational decisions have to be approached quite differently. Aware
of this, Charles Hitch writes:
"I would make the empirical generalization from my experience
at RAND and elsewhere that operations research is the art of
suboptimizing, i.e., of solving some lower-level problems, and that
difficulties increase and our special competence diminishes by an
order of magnitude with every level of decision-making we attempt
to ascend. The sort of simple explicit model which operations
researchers are so proficient in using can certainly reflect most of the
significantfactorsinfluencingtrafficcontrol on theGeorge
Washington Bridge, but the proportion of relevant reality which we
See the survey: Ward Edwards, "The Theory of Decision-Making," Psychological
Bulletin, July 1954, pp. 380—417. The older theory has, of course, been extended, through
statistical and mathematical theory, to deal more adequately with limitations on
information.
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can represent by any such model or models in studying, say, a
major foreign-policy decision, appears to be almost trivial."6
3. Incremental Decision-Making
We need now to pause to make clear and rather exact the signifi-
cance of the fact that conventional principles do not face up to either
the complexity of decision-making or its special value problems.
A common but too quickly despairing inference is that we have no
alternative but to press on as far as possible toward comprehensive
overviews of our collective problems, toward clarification of objectives,
toward structuring each decision as a means-end problem, toward
deliberateness and explicitness of choice, and the like. Those who
make this inference will grant that man's capacity to employ these
methods successfully is indeed limited, that government expenditure
and taxation policies, therefore, will at best be none too good; but
they may somewhat paradoxically take heart from the discrepancy
between practice and norm by believing that the only continuously
serviceable norms are those impossible to reach.
Butfor rational decision-making there is any alternative to
comprehensiveness, the means-end approach, deliberateness and
explicitness, and the like, the more sensible inference would be to
employ these methods only when their limits permit and to employ
an alternative when available. A big "if," it will be replied. Let us
see. A fundamental characteristic of the literature on expenditure
and taxation decisions is that it has not explored the possibility of
alternatives, as I now propose to do.
There are a number of ways in which a decision-maker, within
government or out, can approach a rational decision that departs
considerably from the practice of the conventional principles out-
lined above.7 Herbert Simon, for example, has constructed a model
of "satisficing" rather than maximizing. It takes account of limits
on man's cognitive capacities, by simplifying both the welfare or
pay-off function and the process of search for a satisfactory solution.8
Its implications for government decision-making procedures remain
to be explored but are not, I should think, trivial.
6CharlesHitch, "Operations Research and National Planning—A Dissent," Opera-
tionsResearch,October 1957, P. 718.
It is apparent by now that I am not going to define rationality. The reader is invited
to supply his own definition, for I think what I have to say about rationality is as true
for one concept of it as for another among the common definitions.
8HerbertSimon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, February 1955, pp. 99—118.
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Problems of resource allocation in wartime led E. A. G. Robinson
to the hypothesis: "The golden rule of all planning is that it must be
done in terms of the scarcest of the resources."9 This, the "bottleneck
principle," is hardly more than a hint at still another model of
rational decision-making; but it may be the germ of a principle for
drastically simplifying a complex problem so that it can be as ration-
ally decided, for all the makeshift appearance of the decision, as
through an inevitably futile attempt to comprehend all the com-
plexities of the problem.
Still other ways of simplifying decision-making tasks to avoid
irrationalities might be mentioned. Among them is one I have
elsewhere described in some detail under the label of the incremental
method.'° I suggest that it is actually the most common method
through which public policy decisions, including decisions on taxes
and expenditures, are approached. That it is a method commonly
practiced has led us to take it for granted rather than formalize it
in terms like those that formalize incremental consumer choice, to
which it is obviously related.
The incremental method is characterized by its practitioner's
preoccupation with: (1) only that limited set of policy alternatives
that are politically relevant, these typically being policies only
incrementally different from existing policies; (2) analysis of only
those aspects of policies with respect to which the alternatives differ;
(3) a view of the policy choice as one in a succession of choices;
(4) the marginal values of various social objectives and constraints;
(5) an intermixture of evaluation and empirical analysis rather than
an empirical analysis of the consequences of policies for objectives
independently determined; and (6) only a small number out of all
the important relevant values.
Of thesesixcharacteristics,thefirstthree are recognizable
characteristics of political decision-making, as practiced by both
officials and most policy-minded academic analysts.I shall not
linger over them except to point Out that anyone whose approach
meets the first three conditions has enormously simplified his policy
problems compared to what they would be if he liter,ally and strictly
followed the conventional prescription to attempt a comprehen-
sive overview. The fourth and fifth strike at the value problem in
D. N. Chester, ed., Lessons of the British War Economy; Cambridge University
Press, 1951, p. 57.
10Lindblom,"Policy Analysis," American Economic Review, June 1958, pp. 298—3 12.
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policy-making; and the sixth strikes at the general complexity of
policy analysis, although in what appears to be a shocking way.
Let us first consider problems of handling values. In the incremental
method, political decision-makers handle values through marginal
comparisons in the same way that consumers do. Although econo-
mists describe rational consumer behavior by reference to utility
surfaces, indifference curves, demand schedules, and the like, a
rational consumer need know nothing about them. He need not
first determine his indifference curve for oranges and apples and
subsequently decide his purchase policies accordingly. Nor need
he first try to comprehend all possible product mixes (or even a few
alternative product mixes), then decide which one he prefers, and
only then make those purchases necessary to attain the preferred
mix. The rational consumer proceeds directly to marginal comparison
of alternative specific purchases. The way in which we economists
can, for our own professional purposes, conceptualize consumer
choice obscures the great difference between what the consumer can
be conceived of as having done but does not actually do—ascertain
a function, then choose so as to maximize it—and what he actually
does—simply compare policies at the margin and choose directly the
preferred policy.
Like the consumer, the incremental decision-maker in govern-
mental affairs does not make use of a utility function, in his case a
social welfare function. He does not think in terms of "all the vari-
ables that might be considered as affecting welfare: the amounts
of each and every kind of good consumed by and service performed
by each and every household, the amount of each and every kind
of capital investment undertaken, and so on."1' He can hardly be
said to know even a point or two on such a function because he does
not think in terms of alternative social states; and, if he can be said
to value one social state higher than another, this fact is more
to be inferred from his choices than said to control them. He makes
specific choices, as does the consumer, at the margin.
Similarly, incremental decision-makers closely intermix empirical
and value elements in choice as do consumers. We may describe a
consumer who buys a car as having decided upon such a purchase
policy in order to attain such objectives or values as speed of move-
ment, ready accessibility of transportation, improved status, and
Abram Bergson, "Socialist Economics," in H. S. Ellis, ed., A Survey of Contempor-
ary Economics, Blakiston, 1947, p. 417.
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conformity, as well as the pleasures of novelty, display, color and
form, and acquisition itself. To decide whether to buy a car and, if
so, which car, requires then that he both choose among combinations
of such values as these and empirically investigate the consequences
of alternative purchase policies for the attainment of each of these
values. Thus he must make two kinds of choices: (1) the preferred
value-mix and (b) the purchase best suited to the attainment of the
preferred value-mix. In actual fact, however, he makes these two
choices simultaneously when he decides upon his purchase; he does
not in one choice determine the preferred value-mix and then make
his purchase in its light.
Moreover, he would find it difficult to describe, even to himself,
his preferences among the objectives except by pointing to the
purchase made and those rejected. Furthermore, he would confess
that many of the objectives or values served by his purchase appeared
to him as relevant only after alternative purchase policies began to
compete in his mind. He did not, for example, first consider buying
a car in order to satisfy his esthetic senses, but esthetic values
quickly became relevant once he contemplated buying a car.
Although it is customary to analyze values as a first step in policy
making, it is a characteristic of the incremental method that such
an analysis is cursory, short-lived, and only a prefatory clarification
of a few of the many goal-values that will be affected by policies to be
considered. Sometimes such an analysis is omitted entirely. Either
at once or very quickly in incremental decision-making, the analysis
turns directly to alternative policies. Predicting consequences of
alternative policies and evaluating the consequences then become
intertwined to the degree that, as in consumer choice, only in the
final choice among policies is the final choice among objectives or
values itself made.
For example, many policy analysts find it extremely difficult to
decide how much inflation they are willing to tolerate in order to
achieve some specifiedreductionin unemployment except in
contemplation of some particular set of policy alternatives offering
marginally different prospective amounts of inflation and un-
employment. Or, again, none of us do very well in describing to
others—or even to ourselves—the relative value of economic security
and rapid economic growth. But we make the choice when confronted
with alternative policies offering different increments of the two
values. Again, we do not determine our welfare function, then choose,
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but instead choose directly and, in so doing, simultaneously both
indirectly define a part of a welfare function and maximize it.
It is also a characteristic of the incremental method that the
decision-maker is much more tentative about his objectives or values
than he is considered to be in conventional models. He counts on
policy choices to lead him to fresh perceptions about values, he
expects to learn about his values from his experiences with pursuing
and enjoying them, and he is inclined to think that in the long run.
policy choices have as great an influence on objectives as objectives
have on policy choices.'2
If incrementalism is a method through which a single decision-
maker can rationally evaluate alternative policies, it also offers a
solution to the problem of disagreement among decision-makers on
values. Incrementalism sidesteps problems posed by disagreement on
values because decision-makers deal directly with policies, as has
just been explained; no virtue attaches, as it does in the conventional
method, to prior discussion of and agreement on objectives or values.
This characteristic of incrementalism makes agreement possible
in at least three distinguishable ways. First, ideological and other
differences in values that loom large when considered abstractly
do not necessarily stand in the way of agreed marginal values.
Second, the practice of evaluating only in actual choice situations
often leads decision-makers to reconsider values in the light of
practical constraints, and reconsideration often moves them toward
agreement. Third—and much more important—individuals can often
agree on policies even i.f they hold conflicting values. A group of
decision-makers can agree, for example, on the desirability of a
sales tax without agreeing on objectives; they may have quite different
values and reasons in mind. It will be shown in a later section that
incrementalism makes still another attack on the problem of dis-
agreement: sometimes incremental policy-makers are coordinated
by methods that do not require them to agree with one another on
either values or policies.
12Howthen distinguish, it might be asked, a rational and irrational decision? The
conventional model defines a rationally chosen policy by its relation to a set of objectives.
A rational policy, for example, is one that attains its objectives, or maximizes the proba-
bility of doing so, or is, by warranted beliefs, best suited to attainment of its objectives.
Butsincefor complex public policy decisions, the decision-makers' objectives are
defined by the policy choice he makes, the principal characteristic of the rational
decision—perhaps the defining characteristic—turns on the accuracy of the decision-
maker's predictions about the outcome of his policies. We shall, however, say more
about this below.
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As for the general problem of complexity in policy-making, the
most drastic simplification of complex problems achieved in incre-
mental decision-making is, as already indicated, through outright
neglect of important consequences of policies. Neglect of important
variables is so widely preached against that it may be worthwhile
to make the point that all policy analysts practice such neglect and
intend to go on doing so. In academic policy analysis, we economists
routinely leave a mound of unfinished business for the political
scientist, sociologist, or psychologist to attend to; and we only
sometimes remember to qualify our results accordingly. We leave
to the psychologist, for example, the appraisal of malingering when
we analyze the desirability of liberalizing benefits under unemploy-
ment compensation. Less obvious but no less common is every
policy analyst's neglect of imponderables, even when they are
considered to be important. Beyond these omissions are many others,
some of which appear at least superficially to be arbitrary or random,
others of which are traceable to our ignorance. Examples are
extremely long-run consequences for family solidarity of increasing
urbanization achieved as a result of agricultural expenditures (or
restrictions of expenditures) that induce farmers to leave the land;
short-term consequences for corporate concentration of military
procurement decisions; and consequences for the development of
socialized medicine of liberal expenditures on veterans' medical
care.
If important consequences are neglected, can the method still be
described as one suitable for rational decision-making? Or is
omission of important consequences a proof of irrationality?
Whatever one's concept of rationality, I suggest that the answer in
principle is clear. If the consequences are not neglected in the
processes by which policies are determined, then that they are
neglected by any given decision-maker is not evidence of irrationality
in decision-making. Less cryptically, if values neglected by some
decision-makers are the concern of other decision-makers, public
policies taken together can be rational. We often permit the fallacy
of composition to obscure this insight. Or, to put it another way,
we often miss this point because we have applied to politics a
confusion of partial and general equilibrium analysis.
Consider a hypothetical example. The President and some of his
advisers agree on a greatly expanded program of highway expendi-
tures. Their objectives are national defense, reduction of highway
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congestion for civilians, and economic development. Consequences
of the program for the parity of the 50statesas recipients of federal
funds are ignored, as are possible consequences for auto fatalities,
design of automobiles, profits of existing toll roads, destruction of
homes and recreational areas, sales of automobiles, sales of home
furnishings, character of home life,participation in organized
religion, and so on.
When the program is presented to Congress, if not before, some of
the neglected values will be spoken for by, say, representatives of the
states or of toll-road authorities. These interests may come to
terms immediately with the original proponents of the program,
not necessarily by each representative's taking into account each
other's values but by agreement directly on modifications of the
program. Other interests will wait until congressional consideration
of the program is underway, and still other interests will be brought
to bear on the administrative officials eventually responsible for
implementing the program. And years later, when it becomes
apparent to churchmen that too many people are out driving on
Sunday rather than attending religious services, they will stir them-
selves to find ways of combating the tendency. When they do so,
they will not necessarily associate the tendency with the earlier high-
way program, and it is not at all necessary that they do so in order
to deal with their problem.
I intend the example to do no more than show the possibility
that decisions can be rational even if each decision-maker ignores
important values, if only the values neglected at one point are
attended to at another. It is not necessary to show that all values
are given equal consideration; they are not in the conventional
method. Nor isit necessary to show that their inequalities are
systematic or are understandable in terms of some formula; they
are not in the conventional method. Nor is it necessary to show that
all important values are brought somehow to bear on each decision,
even if not on each decision-maker. For sometimes a neglected value
will move no one to action until a decade later when it becomes clear
that it is being endangered.
The example I chose was not after all very hypothetical; the
processes illustrated are familiar. Let us, therefore, explore further
the possibility that interconnections among decision-makers in
actual fact accomplish rational decision-making despite the apparent
irrationalities of each decision taken by itself. We turn thus to an
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aspect of decision-making that can be posed explicitly as the problem
of coordination.
4. Coordination Through Partisan Mutual Adjustment
Coordination is worth exploring for several reasons. First, we
have been lead into it by an exploration of ways in which decision-
makers simplify their problems and hence achieve a rationality that
would be denied them if they tried to comprehend their problems
fully. The possibilities that decision-makers are •achieving some
notable degree of rationality through the practice of what we have
called the incremental method depend in large part on how the
decisions are related to each other. Second, quite aside from incre-
mentalism, coordination is an aspect of decision-making with its
own special difficulties usually not sufficiently distinguished from
decision-making in general. Third, in the study of expenditure
decisions, budgeting usually emerges as the dominant coordinating
process, and we shall want later to reconsider budgeting in the light
of alternative coordinating mechanisms actually in use or potentially
useful.
One group of possible coordinating devices includes, of course,
the very same procedures that have already been described for
decision-making generally: the conventional, method with its attempt
at comprehensiveness of overview; and the alternative methods for
simplifying decision-making, i.e., bottleneck planning, satisficing,
and incrementalism. These are all similar in that, if they are used for
coordinating decisions, the principal coordinating mechanism is a
centrally located mind or centrally located, closely cooperating group
of minds. Consideration of their prospects for achieving rational
coordinating decisions raises the same questions as we have already
raised about them, and I shall consequently pass them by with only
two comments.
With respect to the conventional method, because limitations on
rationality are posed both by value conflicts and by the complexity
of problems, these limitations would appear to be even more serious
in the case of coordinating decisions than for decisions generally.
With respect to the incremental approach to decisions, it is indeed
a possible coordinating method; but, because one of our claims for
it is that individual decision-making irrationalities are compensated
for by characteristics of a coordinating mechanism appropriate
to it (and yet to be explored), to defend incrementalism itself as
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an approach to coordinating decisions is, though not impossible,
difficult.
To what extent the coordination of, say, total federal revenues and
expenditures—they are coordinated, even if not ideally—is accom-
plished through this first group of coordinating methods is not clear.
As we have seen, the absence of formal machinery for a centrally
comprehended coordinating decision does not prove the absence of
central coordination. Assuming some degree of central coordination,
achieved perhaps through informal consultation, we do not know
what mixture of such approaches as the conventional and the
incremental is employed. In any case, inspection of such a problem
in coordination as this one would quickly lead us to believe that a
second type of coordination, not marked by central comprehension,
is also exploited.
The second type, so far as I know, has been best elaborated, though
with some troublesome ambiguities in presentation, by Michael
Polanyi in a little known essay in which he attempts to generalize
from market coordination processes.'3 This is a method in which each
of a number of decision-making centers desiring a solution to a
commonly recognized problem that cannot be centrally solved
independently makes an adjustment to the positions taken at each
other decision-making center. A long succession of such independent
adjustments eventually achieves a solution to the problem when no
center needs make a further adjustment. Polanyi draws an explicit
analogy with certain forms of mathematic problem-solving.
His assumption, on which he perhaps wavers, that participants
in such a process recognize a common problem and deliberately
cooperate is an assumption explicitly to be denied in describing still
a third kind of coordination: the mutual adjustment of partisan
decision-makers. In this kind of coordination, adjustments to each
other are made by decision-makers who do not share common
criteria, differ in the values they think important, do not necessarily
cooperate with each other or recognize any common problem.
It is an especially significant kind of coordination for incremental
decision-makers because, to the extent that they simplify their
problems by concentrating on some values to the exclusion of others,
they become the very kind of partisan we have just described. It is
in this third kind of coordination that we shall find the mechanisms
"MichaelPolanyi, "Manageability of Social Tasks," The Logic of Liberty, University
of Chicago Press, 1951.
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through which incremental decisions are often made parts of a larger
rational policy-making process.
Partisan mutual adjustment is commonplace for coordination of
any two or more of such individuals and groups as the President,
Director of the Budget Bureau, individual legislators, congressional
committees and subcommittees, administrators at various levels, and
countless private groups. At least three major types of partisan
mutual adjustment can be distinguished although any one individual
or group is often simultaneously engaged in all three.'4
A. ATOMISTIC. This first type is suggested by atomistic mutual
adjustment in the hypothetical purely competitive market. Each
decision-making group simply ignores the repercussions of its
decisions on other groups in deciding upon its own policies. The
decision-maker may or may not know that his decisions have
repercussions for other groups; in either case he ignores them. It
follows that he does not attempt to manipulate other groups. In
the example above, protagonists of a highway program can simply
ignore the consequences of their policies for church groups, for
taxpayer associations, or for wildlife conservationists. Typically, a
group acts atomistically with respect to some but not all other groups.
The atomistic method is, I think, the equivalent of Polanyi's method
except for what I believe to be his assumptions of a common
recognition of a problem and of deliberate cooperation.
In the atomistic method, each partisan group will find itself
constantly adjusting its policies as it finds that other groups have
created the need for an alteration in its course of action. A continuing
process of mutual adjustment could conceivably work through
successive approximations to an equilibrium in which no further
moves are necessary; but, equilibrium tendencies or not, it interlocks
the various groups whose policies are consequential for each other.
B. DEFERENTIAL. In this adjustment process, each decision-maker
avoids any policy that would constrain or adversely affect another
group. In our own private affairs, each of us is accustomed to leaving
unchallenged to each of our associates certain areas of personal
choice. Similarly, there develops in the arena a set of mutual
14Itwill be apparent to many that in exploring these processes I am following the
tradition of the pluralists in political theory.But my professional interests in the
application of the results of these inquiries to problems of collective expenditure and
other economic decisions turns my interest toward the calculation aspects of these
processes rather than the control aspects. More concretely, where a political scientist
asks whether these processes safeguard us against an overconcentration of power, I ask
whether they can aid us in rational choice.
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concessions of jurisdiction or authority among decision-makers,
individual or group. In addition, private citizen and public policy-
maker alike defer in order to avoid adverse counter moves. In such
a process as this, decision-makers seek a way to attain their objectives
in the areas of free movement left open by the activities of other
decision-makers. Some congressmen will not pursue their policy
objectives if they turn out to challenge the President's program;
and similarly in some areas of choice formally open to the President,
he willdefer,say, to a congressional coalition. Again, decisions are
closely interlocked by this process of mutual adjustment.
C. STRATEGIC. In this method, decision-makers manipulate each
other in a variety of ways. They may do so by partisan discussion, in
which they try to win other decision-makers over to their preferred
decisions by whatever purely verbal appeals they think might be
effective. This kind of discussion differs from discussion that proceeds
in the light of agreed objectives or end values, and its possibilities
for achieving coordination throw, I suggest, a new light on the loose
but stimulating older concept of democracy as government by dis-
CuSSion. It is the kind of discussion in which an advocate of tax
reduction in the Senate might appeal to his high-expenditure colleague
not through values shared but by calling the colleague's attention to
facts favorable to tax reduction or by reference to his colleague's
values or objectives.
Second, decision-makers may manipulate each other by the
exchange of effective threats and promises. The Pick-Sloan plan
for the Missouri River is an example of the product of an exchange
of promises, in this case between the Army Engineers and the
Reclamation Bureau. An exchange of threats, and promises is a
common outgrowth of partisan discussion, but I mean to define
partisan discussion to exclude it, so that it can be seen as distinct.
Such an exchange I shall refer to as bargaining, following, in so
doing, one common usage. Partisan discussion and bargaining, as
I. have defined the latter, are typically intermixed.
Third, they may manipulate each other by a variety of pressures
on each other beyond partisan discussion and bargaining, that is,
by injuring, forestalling, or crippling each other directly. For this
no intercommunication is required, as in partisan discussion and
bargaining; and the frustrated group or decision-maker may not
even know the source of the frustration. Here, as also in bargaining,
one of the principal strategies is to form an alliance or coalition.
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Among several advantages gained through alliance, one is that,
where one group is without a direct method of influence on a third,
it may use a second as an instrument, as when the President is
induced by one group to dismiss the head of an agency that stands
in the way of the first group. The National Wildlife Association and
the American Forestry Association are examples of a pair of con-
flicting decision-making groups both powerless to make legislation
and administrative decisions alone, hence both engaged in building
alliances with legislators, other interest groups, and individual voters.
How often these methods for partisan mutual adjustment achieve
a rational coordination of decisions is not realized. That they
interlock decisions made at various points in the body politic is
clear enough; that they are methods for interlocking a multiplicity
of incrementally approached decisions is also clear. In addition,
whatever its defects, partisan mutual adjustment achieves whatever
coordination it does achieve without making coordination a staggering
intellectual task. To the extent achieved, coordination is a by-
product of decision-making, as in market processes. Nor does
coordination, so achieved, make staggering demands for information,
because the facts needed to achieve an intellectual coordination are
required by no one. Finally, coordination so achieved does not
depend upon agreed objectives or values. In short, partisan mutual
adjustment strikes at both the complexity problem and the values
problem.
But what if the interlocking of decisions is without any perceivable
desirable pattern? It ha's to be shown that coordination so achieved
is rational in some sense going beyond what we have already said.
I suggest the following hypotheses:
1. Partisan mutual adjustment is a process through which any value
held to be important by any group of people can be made influential
on policy-making. The common objection that not all important
interests are participant in each decision is, for reasons discussed
above, not valid; it is sufficient for the truth of this hypothesis that
each interest be somewhere influential.
2. It often achieves a satisfactory weighting of conflicting values
or interests in policy-making. Because, as argued above, there is no
agreed formula for weighting of conflicting values in our society,
any one of, a large range of possible systems of weights is no less
satisfactory by any agreed standard than another. And since any
system of weight used in conventional methods of coordination is
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to a degree arbitrary, it need only be shown that the system of
weights used in mutual adjustment is sometimes better.
While accidents of strategic position and other factors will produce
a wide variety of weight from one policy area to another, a supporting
hypothesis is that policy will respond relatively more to widely
shared and/or intensely held values than to less widely shared
and/or less intensely held values and that, consequently, values will
in effect often be weighted in a satisfactory way. This supporting
hypothesis is all the more probable because of the practice of groups
to form alliances around common or adjacent interests. It does not
imply that all individuals express their values and the intensity of
their values by the degree to which they participate in the mutual
adjustment of groups in the political arena. On the contrary, a
satisfactory system of weights could evolve from the mutual adjust-
ment of groups representing a small minority of citizens if the distri-
bution of values and intensities among the participating minority
corresponded roughly to its distribution in a larger population
consisting of citizens not indifferent to policies even if not partici-
pating. Again, the system of weights does not have to meet any very
restrictive conditions in order for it to be satisfactory in the light
of alternative methods of coordination.
3. In particular, the weighting of interests in mutual adjustment
meets the requirements of consent. Put down roughly, for brevity's
sake, the hypothesis takes account of the alleged precondition of
democratic government: that citizens must agree on certain funda-
mental values and procedures, despite their disagreements on others.
Societies can be thought of as purchasing this agreement, or consent
to continuation of democratic government, by conceding to each
interest group whatever it requires as a price for its consent. (If too
many groups demand too high a price, their demands cannot be met,
and democratic government is impossible.) Mutual adjustment is a
process in which, when the intensity of frustration of group interests
threatens democratic consent, the fact is plain; and the option is
open to other groups to pay the necessary price. This is an aspect of
mutual adjustment much to be prized, I suggest, even if it is some-
times converted into blackmail, as perhaps it has been in the fight
against desegregation.
These three hypotheses deal directly with the suspicion almost all
of us entertain that mutual adjustment is an arbitrary coordinating
mechanism. I suggest that they are sufficient both to call into question
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the widespread view that central coordination is generally superior
and to argue the desirability of comparative study of the two methods,
with the hope of discovering just when the one is superior to the
other.
Three additional hypotheses throw further, though indirect, light
on the value of mutual adjustment as a coordinating process.
4. Partisan mutual adjustmentclar(fiescitizens' perception of
their own preferences and leadership's knowledge of citizens' prefer-
ences. I can only allude briefly to competition among potential
group leaders for followers as having the effect of stimulating each
leader to outdo his rivals in articulating for the group its preferences
and. its best avenues toward their gratification.
5. It also often diss4iates conflict stemming from narrow or hastily
considered views of group interests by group members. The search
for allies in multilateral bargaining, for example, puts enormous
pressure on group leaders to find a way of defining a group's
interest so that it can be harmonized with the interests of potential
allies. Mutual adjustment will often achieve not merely a compromise
of interests but what Mary Parker Follett has called an integration of
interests
6.Whether mutual adjustment is or is not more coercive than
cent rally achieved coordination depends upon the rules of the game
by which the mutually adjusting groups play. In view of some
tendencies to stress the coercive aspects of mutual adjustment, it is
relevant to emphasize its contribution to winning consent, to point
up the inevitability of coercion in central coordination, and finally
to point out that, while mutual adjustment could and does under
some rules lead to violence, as between nations, in other circumstances
it can be and is played by rules that respect traditional constraints
on the use of coercion.
5. Implications for Norms and
We now turn to the implications of all the foregoing for norms
and principles for decision-makers and designers of decision-making
machinery in the field, of taxation and expenditure decisions. To
the extent that incrementalism together with partisan mutual adjust-
ment is a set of processes for rational decision-making, its first
implications for norms and principles in decision-making are already
15I-I.C. Metcalf and L. Urwick, eds., Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers
of Mary Parker Follett, Harper, 1942, pp. 31 if.
318DECISION-MAKING IN TAXATION AND EXPENDITURES
obvious from the foregoing discussion. Although these first impli-
cations are destructive more than constructive, to go very far beyond
them requires research and reflection that has hardly yet been
attempted and which has in fact been inhibited by the common
preoccupation with conventionally conceived decision-making.
The first and obvious implication isthat, to the extent that
incrementalism and mutual adjustment are defensible, every single
one of the conventional norms explicitly listed in the early pages of
this paper is invalidated. Some of them are reduced to norms
appropriate to particular circumstances in which central compre-
hension is possible; others are entirely inappropriate.
It would be tedious to discuss each in turn; inspection of them in
the light of the foregoing argument should be sufficient. But it may
be helpful to recapitulate some principal points of the foregoing
argument as explicit comment on each of the seven listed principles
on which the more numerous prescriptions rest. Each of the seven
is in some substantial way invalidated.
A. COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW. It follows from all the foregoing that
deliberate omission of important relevant values from the analysis
of a decision is desirable for sufficiently complex decisions, or for
decisions in which decision-makers cannot agree on values; and the
circumstances in which each omission is satisfactory increase with
the adequacy of partisan mutual adjustment for the coordination of
the decisions so made.
B. DEFINED SOCIAL OBJECTIVES. For collectivedecisions,they
cannot be defined if they cannot be agreed upon, as is typically the
case for large-scale social choice. Often social objectives can be
defined only through actual marginal policy choices by individuals
or by groups within which values are agreed upon. It is then sufficient
that such individuals and groups agree on policy, even if they do not
agree on objectives; and atomistic and deferential mutual adjustment
achieve policy-making even without agreement on policy. Hence
the principle is often inappropriate in that it defines a quite un-
necessary requirement for rational collective choice.
C. MEANS-END APPROACH. Where values cannot be agreed upon, it
is not desirable that participant decision-makers look upon their
problem as a collective means-end problem; it is sufficient that they
simply find a basis for agreement without regard to which variables
are means and which are ends. Or it is sufficient in some types of
mutual adjustment, such as atomistic and deferential, that they see
319DECISION-MAKING IN TAXATION AND EXPENDITURES
the policy problem only as a problem of adaptation of means to their
own private partisan ends. Moreover, since ends and means are
simultaneously finally chosen in incremental policy-making, it is
not desirable that policies be chosen as means to previously clarified
ends. Finally, it is desirable that ends be considered as quite tentative
and that they be reformulated with each policy choice in such close
interconnection that it can be said that ends follow choice of means
as much as means follow choice of ends.
D. DELIBERATE AND EXPLICIT CHOICE. It is desirable that some
policies be set as a by-product of partisan mutual adjustment rather
than deliberately and explicitly. Just as we do not have in a price
system a deliberate and explicit choice among resource allocations
but permit allocation to be determined as a by-product of a multi-
plicity of market decisions, so policy on, say, income distribution in
the United States may be an example of a policy best achieved as a
by-product of more particular decisions on factors affecting income
distribution. Or, for another example, it may be desirable to let the
aggregate size of the military budget emerge as a by-product of
decisions on specific expenditure programs and not raise the aggre-
gate as an explicit problem at any time. On values and objectives,
it follows from comments on the means-end approach that values
or objectives should quite commonly not be made the object of
explicit and deliberate choice but should be chosen implicitly at
the margin through an actual policy choice and should not be
articulated as an unnecessary obstruction to agreement on policy.
E. UNIFIED DECISION PROCESS. This normative principle, specifying
the general appropriateness of hierarchical forms of organization
to knit decision-makers together, simply leaves no room for co-
ordination through partisan mutual adjustment.
F. REASON AND COOPERATION. The whole point of the argument of
this paper might be reduced to the proposition that reason runs out,
cannot bear the burdens imposed on it, therefore has to be employed
in the light of its limitations. A general prescription to employ
reason in decision-making, however persuasive, is less wise than a
prescription to use reason in establishing such decision-making
machinery as reduces the demands made on reason and achieves
a coordination of only partly reasoned decisions through processes
of adjustment other than those that go on in the human mind.
Because partisanship is an asset (because it simplifies), conflict
becomes not a problem but a method of coordination. Conflict is as
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useful, therefore, as cooperation. Conflict between the President and
Congress, for example, or between two administrative agencies is,
within limits still to be explored, to be prized as an essential element
in partisan mutual adjustment.
G. CALCULATION AND MINIMIZATION OF COST.This principle
requires more extended comment than given to the others, although
the principal grounds for qualifying the principle are inferrable from
the above comments on the means-end approach.
Let us take the example of expenditures for inspection of income
tax returns, an allegedly clear case in which a larger expenditure than
at present would easily recoup its costs in increased tax receipts.
Assume that those making the decision are divided among those who
want the increased receipts and are willing to expand the necessary
funds to accomplish their objective, those who welcome an oppor-
tunity to weaken income taxation, and those who, while favorably
disposed to income taxation, are not happy about the extent to which
its enforcement requires detailed investigation of personal affairs
by revenue officials. Each can calculate costs as he sees them, both
monetary and intangible. Typically, at some stage a policy will in
fact emerge; but, given the assumption that their values differ, they
will not have aggregated their values into a pay-off or welfare function
(assuming, of course, they do not have an overriding agreed value
in the form of such a function). Hence the policy finally arrived at
by agreement or by other mutual adjustment is just that—a policy,
not their response to an agreed compromise or aggregation of their
conflicting values.
Given this solution to their problem, it cannot be asked and
answered whether the costs of achieving a social objective were
minimized or not, except by the arbitrary injection of the personal
values of the observer who asks the question. In this case, a pre-
scription that costs be calculated and minimized could be appropriate
only for the partisan problem-solving of the participant decision-
makers, which is not the way in which such a prescription is ordinarily
intended. As a prescription intended for some collectivity like the
House of Representatives, it is not operational, for the House as a
whole cannot agree on what is value received and what is cost.
To go further, it would not even always be desirable, even if
possible, for the House to agree on an aggregating rule for conflicting
values so that, in the light of such an aggregation, choices could be
made that did maximize values received or minimize costs. For
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presumably such a rule would itself be a product of partisan mutual
adjustment. To minimize costs under such circumstances would
therefore be simply to make policies consistent with prior partisan
adjustment of conflicting values. It is not at all clear that this is to
be preferred to the direct partisan mutual adjustment of policy
conflicts without prior resolution of value differences. The arbitrary
element is only more apparent in the one method than in the other.
The same line of argument holds for choice among expenditures
on, say, heavy bombers, medium bombers, and missiles of various
kinds. It is easy to advocate the policy of providing the biggest bang
for a buck; but, in the absence of agreement among bargainers for
various branches of the military or among congressmen on just
what weapon has the biggest bang, the prescription reduces to the
advice to the partisan interests to minimize costs or maximize
objectives as they narrowly see them, or else the prescription is again
nonoperational.
One appropriate alternative prescription in cases such as these is
that expenditures should be undertaken that participant decision-
makers can voluntarily agree on, assuming only that each participant
has, in his own limited view, acted economically. Another appropriate
prescription is simply that each decision-maker act economically
and that their independently decided courses of action be coordinated
(policy achieved as a by-product) through atomistic, deferential, or
some type of strategic adjustment not even requiring their agreement,
assuming only that the process of adjustment meets certain conditions.
Still further, let us assume no disagreement whatever on values but
a problem so complex as to go beyond the successful comprehension
of any individual or committee. Under these circumstances, breaking
the problem down into its aspects and throwing decisions into the
hands of partisan groups linked through mutual adjustment may
still be desirable. If so, the appropriate prescription is, again, not
that costs be calculated but that the policy be that on which the
participants can agree or be that policy achieved as a by-product of
mutual adjustment without agreement. Here the of
achieving a value aggregation in the light of which costs be
minimized stems not from conflict but from complexity.
I want now to depart from summary comment on the listed
conventional principles to identify several further illustrative impli-
cations of the foregoing argument for norms for expenditures and
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tax decisions. One of these is interwoven with the last principle
discussed. We have just said that under certain assumptions policy-
makers should take their own voluntary agreement as a criterion for
policy. No doubt this will strike many as curious advice for policy-
making, since one might think that a norm ought to be useful in
distinguishing between agreement on foolish policy and agreement
on wise. The norm of agreement is not, however, so inadequate as
it might seem because it specifies voluntary agreement as sufficient
only when each partisan has in his own limited view calculated his
costs.
Similarly when we said that in some cases a sufficient condition of
a "good" policy is that it be arrived at through partisan mutual
adjustment, this was saved from being a foolish prescription because
we also required that the adjustment processes themselves meet
certain conditions. For lack of research, we cannot now say when
the adjustment processes are and are not satisfactory, but the
distinction is valid, just as is the distinction between workable and
unworkable competition or competition and monopoly despite our
inability to define and agree on what kinds of real world market
structures are workably competitive.
The important point in both prescriptions is that in many circum-
stances we need no test of a correct or wise policy other than that
it has been achieved through one set of processes rather than another.
To pursue the market analogy further, in many circumstances we
need no test of the superiority of one pattern of resource allocation
to another other than that one pattern is achieved through one set
of practices rather than another, the one set being characterized by
open opportunities for comparison, substitution, and choice, and
the other by restrictions. If we can clarify different structures or
circumstances in which mutual adjustment proceeds badly or
well, we should be able to define rational expenditure and tax policy
in many cases without regard to outcome.
In any case, it is not a reasonable objection to mutual adjustment
that I cannot show directly that its outcomes are superior to other
outcomes. As with the most social processes, we argue the superi-
ority of the outcome from the process, not of the process from the
outcome. The constancy of the economist's objection to this con-
clusion when applied to governmental rather than market decisions
simply often reflects the fact that,. while some economists are not
disturbed that consumer preferences lead to allocation policies other
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than best respond to their own personal tastes, when political
preferences lead to government policies not consistent with his
informed and considered preferences, they are tempted to attribute
irrationality to government. When my professional colleagues and
I complain that research. and education are starved for public
funds, we have by no means necessarily seen in this fact evidence of
irrationality; it may be evidence only of the discrepancy between our
and others' tastes.
A further implication is that consistency in government decisions
is not an appropriate norm. As has been explained, atomistic mutual
adjustment and some forms of strategic adjustment take place
through conflicts among programs of government agencies. In-
consistency in government programs is thus inevitable and part of
the mechanism of partisan mutual adjustment. A quite different
reason for inconsistency is that there is no set of "social" preferences
about which the question can be asked: Is their ordering transitive?
(If A is preferred to B and B to C, is A then preferred to C?) Still
further, if we look at observable policies as evidence of an ordering
of preferences. we must not forget that incrementally approached
policies proceed through a continuing succession of adjustments
to ever-changing ends as policies and objectives interact. Hence
we should not even wish to find in the record of actual policy choices
an evidence of transitively ordered preferences.
The next implication suggests a revision of traditional notions of
the appropriate organizational structure for government decision-
making. It is commonly assumed that factoring out or subdividing
decision-making isbest achieved when interdependent
problems and decisions are grouped together in the same subdivision
and when, correspondingly, problems and decisions of low or simple
interdependency are separated into different subdivisions. It follows,
however, from what was said about mutual adjustment that problems
or decisions with a high degree of interdependency should sometimes
be assigned to separate subdivisions so that their interdependencies
can be taken account of not by internal coordination within any
one agency but through partisan mutual adjustment among the
agencies.
Another implication is that gross disparities in group influence
on decisions, disparities going beyond what by any ordinary estimate
would be called a defensible weighting of conflicting interests, are
not to be dismissed as evidence of irrationality if they turn out to be
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simply the evidence of the price that some groups pay to others as
a condition of the latters' consent to playing the rules of the game of
constitutional democracy. We may regret the price paid; but we
would do well to be clear on just what aspect of the decision-making
process we are complaining about. Our norms should not simply
proscribe these disparities.
Let us now look at some of these implications taken together in
application first to the allocation in the large of federal expenditures
and then to the budgetary process. Consider such a choice as that
between social welfare and defense expenditures. How to choose?
We must first distinguish sharply, as conventional approaches to
this problem do not, between the problem of the individual decision-
maker and the problem of coordinating individual decisions, which
may or may not be a decision-making problem itself. It follows from
all the foregoing that, for the individual decision-maker, whether
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the President, a cabinet member,
or congressman, it is a possibility much to be considered that he
cannot make a reasoned decision between defense and welfare when
they are both aggregated. It is true he can think he is thinking;
but whether there is anything for the mind to seize upon when faced
with a choice of some marginal increase in the defense budget as
against a 10 per cent increase in welfare expenditures is problematical.
Faced with aggregates which it must compare and among which it
must choose, it is possible that the mind does not so much calculate
as default—in some quite capricious or arbitrary way turning up a
choice, or leaving the mouth or the hand to make its own decision.
And if the mind tries to break the aggregates down and calculate
the value of their components, it seems clear that it cannot encompass
and interrelate more than a fraction of components at the level of
specificity to which it must descend.
Conceding a considerable looseness in my description of mental
processes, I nevertheless want to make the point that to sit in a
chair and try to think about defense and welfare is not to guarantee
that the mind will do anything with the problem that could properly
be described as systematic calculations. It is quite likely that more
rational decisions can be reached by an individual who tries to
compare some fairlyspecific, concrete—and newly proposed—
military expenditure with some similarly specified innovation in
welfare expenditure, making his choice on specifics and letting the
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aggregates be determined almost wholly as a by-product or residual
decision.
Gross determinations of military or welfare expenditures the
decision-maker can make, I believe, by calculating in aggregates.
But gross determinations are not the repeated business of government
decision-makers; each year presents them instead with choices among
relatively small variations.
There are, however, so many small choices to be made that the
legislature cannot possibly attend to them. As a result the making of
expenditure policy has to pass in large part to civilian and military
administrators, who can attend to the specific kind of comparisons
in which the mind can successfully engage. But these administrators
can at best make rational comparisons of specifics within their own
agency's field, not between them. Hence, without substantial admini-
strative reform, it would appear that a congressman would do well
to become a specialist in interdepartmental and interagency program
comparisons. Since even this assignment is too large, ideally a
congressman ought to ask each major subdivision of government to
identify a small variety of marginal expenditure programs, permitting
the congressman then to approach expenditure allocations as a
specialist in marginal comparisons among the lowest valued incre-
ments to programs of various major subdivisions.
Although I have not qualified this prescription adequately, it
serves to emphasize the probable desirability of specific rather than
aggregate marginal comparisons in Congress and of a highly selective
policy with respect to the specific comparisons to be made. Some of
Congress' much deplored refusal to deal with the larger issues in
expenditure policy and its preoccupation with haphazardly selected
detail is, I think, a laudable even if fumbling attempt to proceed
by such a prescription.
As for the coordination of decisions reached by individual adminis-
trators, politicians, and others, it is only necessary to state again
that debate on the objectives of the military and the objectives of
welfareprogramswillordinarilyaccomplishrelativelylittle.
Similarly, debate on policy alternatives conceived of in large aggre-
gates of expenditures will help relatively little. If agreement can be
reached through debate on specific comparisons and marginal
choices, agreement is sufficient, assuming that the individual com-
parisons of specific alternatives have been well done. Agreement
failing, all we should ask is that the processes through which mutual
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adjustment will produce policy as a by-product meet certain con-
ditions yet to be defined by research.
What then is the appropriate role of the budgetary process in
expenditure and tax decisions? I think the answer requires an
investigation of the budgetary process from a point of view that
has not been taken by previous writers. The literature on the budget,
I think it fair to say, has not given extended consideration to the
implications of incrementalism and partisan mutual adjustment;
were it to give such extended consideration, many firmly held beliefs
would turn out to be either erroneous or undemonstrated. My
view of the conventional norms for the budgetary process is, there-
fore, that of an agnostic, except for my explicit rejection of certain
budgetary norms listed in the first pages of this paper.
To indicate what might follow from verification of the hypothesis
that incrementalism and mutual adjustment are major avenues to
rational decision-making, let me speculate as follows, limiting,
however, my examination of the budget process to its expenditure
programing functions.
It appears possible that the formulation of a comprehensive
federal budget as a strong recommendation to Congress for its
expenditure decisions should be abolished. As a proposal for
expenditure programs, the budget document is not very helpful to
the kind of rational decision-making we have been describing; and,
as a recommendation from the President and Budget Bureau that
the expenditures-mix for the coming year should be as presented
rather than slightly different, it is not very convincing. The circum-
stances of its formulation do not generate much confidence in it
as an incremental program proposal, even if its formulation in some
is well suited in congressional eyes to congressional control
over the administrative branch.
In any case, a formal, comprehensive congressional overview of
the budget should not be ?.ttempted, for it would only drive con-
gressmen into the kind of abstract comparison of aggregates that
we have argued is less satisfactory than highly selective comparison
of specific programs. I might even suggest that the submission of the
budget to Congress as a program for appropriations is made more
defensible the less Congress is induced by its presentation to attempt
to comprehend it in the large.
A comprehensive budget is best used, it may follow, as a back-
ground document to which any decision-maker can refer for reference
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and such guidance as he can take from it, playing a role in decision-
making much like the role, as I understand it, of the Indian Five-
Year Plan. A frequently revised budget, embodying both a report
on prospective expenditures already authorized and recommenda-
tions of the Budget Bureau and President for programs not yet
authorized might well always be available to but never thrust upon
Congress.
Accordingly, congressional appropriations practices would be
altered to permit Congress to make many successive appropriations
for relatively limited numbers of functions or agencies, without a
concentration of budgetary decisions at any one time of the year
and, it might be hoped, to provide for automatic renewal of a very
large number of expenditures so as to permit Congress to revise its
programs in these fields only when it wished.
One of the standard complaints about present practice is the
separation in time and attention between the authorizing legislation
and the appropriations legislation.; A major barrier to bringing the
two together may be the conventional insistence on the inclusion of
all appropriations decisions in the budgetary process. The effect of
my proposals is to get appropriations out of the present budgetary
process so that in a feasible way appropriations can be linked very
tightly to basic legislation.
For income and employment stabilization,the aggregate of
expenditures and revenues must, of course, be systematically adjusted.
•But there are many ways in which the need for adjustment comes to
the attention of congressmen and many ways in which they can meet
the need for systematic adjustment. Above I have expressed skepticism
on the need for new formal machinery, for it appears that this is a
kind of coordination best handled, in view of conflicting values,
through mutual adjustment.If,however, formal machineryis
needed, the budgetary machinery is excessively complex for the
purpose.
Granted that this line of prescription for the budgetary process
flies in the face of a sustained movement toward increasing dependence
on the budget as a major coordinating instrument, no one has yet
made a convincing case that the budgetary process is today an
effective and rational coordinator; it has largely been assumed to be
so. It is quite possible that the present line of budgetary reform,
which goes back at least as far as the Taft administration, was
suited to the much smaller government programs of earlier years.
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But when the Department of Defense alone uses roughly a tenth
of the national product, when it spends more than the national
product of some nations, when it purchases forty times as many
products as marketed by Sears Roebuck,'6 it is no longer safe to
assume that the budgetary problem is still basically the same old
problem.
Without raising any questions about budgeting within agencies,
I suggest in short that comprehensive budgeting for the American
government may be a prerevolutionary method of programing the
expenditures of a government that has indeed gone through a revolu-
tion in its size, complexity, and involvement with citizens' values.
COMMENTS
ABRAM BERGSON, Harvard University•
In his very interesting and provocative paper, Professor Lindblom
analyzes governmental decision-making within a democratic frame-
work. He also explores implications regarding budgetary policies
and practice, I shall focus my remarks on the more general topic.
Professor Lindblom's main theme, as I understand it, concerns
the nature of rational government decision-making. Economists tend
to misunderstand this. Whereas they assume that certain "con-
ventional principles" are generally applicable, in fact rationality
very often calls for the employment of an alternative and analytically
distinct approach, the "incremental method." The presuppositions
of economists regarding government rationality, I am sure, are
sometimes open to question, but I must confess some doubts as
to the fruitfulness of Professor Lindblom's attempt to distinguish
on this basis between "conventional principles" and the "incremental
method."
As seen by Professor Lindblom, economists misconceive rationality
in various ways. Among these, not the least is in the view taken of
the alternatives open and, in association with this, the degree of
delineation of values that is entailed. According to "conventional
principles," the government official ordinarily must choose between
a wide range of alternative social states. Accordingly, one ideally
10Fromcalculations made in the Procurement Task Force of the Second Hoover
Commission, summarized in a letter of March 17, 1959, from Jay Westcott to C.E.L.
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takes as a point of departure, a "social welfare function" defining
the values to be attached these alternatives. As seen by Lindblom,
the choice in fact is very often quite restricted by political considera-
tions. Not only is the set of alternatives limited but also, typically,
these differ from each other only in rather marginal ways. It follows
that rational action calls for the valuation of only these limited
aspects. This, I believe, is a cardinal feature of the "incremental
method."
In elaborating the presuppositions of economists, Professor
Lindblom takes as a point of departure Professor Smithies' study
of the budgetary process, but on a theoretical plane he evidently
refers throughout to the conception found in welfare economics.
I think we must concede that this discipline is, from a political
standpoint, notably abstract. Among other things, the variety of
social states considered is generally not restricted to those that might
be politically relevant. Moreover, Professor Lindblom might, with
no less justice, have added that the analysis is not especially easy
to apply where political constraints are introduced. The principles
to be observed in selecting the "second best" are not necessarily
the same and indeed may often be rather different from those applying
where the concern is with the "first best."
But granting all this, I wonder if Professor Lindblom has sufficiently
considered what is involved even in the appraisal of limited alter-
natives to which he refers. After all, even the most restricted actions
of government are apt to have pervasive effects. Without some fairly
extensive commitments regarding the shape of the "social welfare
function," it is open to question whether one would be. able even
to begin to appraise the alternatives rationally. Moreover, the
commitment ordinarily will be hardly any less restrictive than that
usually made in welfare economics.
More specifically, a principal effect of government action ordinarily
is in respect to the volume of goods and services produced and
marketed privately. How is one to value the diverse goods and
services affected? At their market prices? If not, how otherwise?
If different households are affected differently, how is this aspect
viewed? The import of the questions is evident. Even to begin to
think systematically about such alternatives one cannot very well
dispense with the principle of "consumers' sovereignty" or some
variant thereof. Moreover, if one adds to this some general stand-
point on income distribution one has already gone as far as the
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welfare economist ordinarily does in defining on a theoretical plane
the "social welfare function."
I have been referring to the question of the alternatives open and
the degree of delineation of values. Logically, prior to the latter
aspect is the question of the general nature of the valuation process
itself. As seen by Professor Lindblom, there may be dubious pre-
conceptions here also. Among other things, referenceis made
ordinarily to a value scale that is both explicit and relatively static.
These notions,too, have become embodied in"conventional
principles." In fact, however, the situation may often be quite
different."In the incremental method, political decision-makers
handle values through marginal comparisons in the same way that
consumers do." If the official "can be said to value one social
state higher than another, this fact is more to be inferred from his
choices than to control them....Wedo not determine our welfare
function, then choose, but instead choose directly and, in so doing,
simultaneously both indirectly define a part of the welfare function
and maximize it." Moreover, the "decision-maker is much more
tentative about his objectives or values than he is considered to be
in conventional models. I-fe counts on policy to lead him to fresh
perceptions about values."
It is true that the presuppositions of welfare economics as to the
nature of rational decision-making may often be overly formal and
correspondingly too restrictive. On the other hand, one might
easily err also in stressing unduly the aspects Professor Lindblom
describes. No doubt both the consumer and the public official
may often behave rationally without consciously applying any
previously determined value scale, but at least for the official the
choices, as we have seen, are highly complex. Without reference to
some guiding principles, it is permissible to doubt that any high
degree of rationality could be This still is not to say the
official must carry in his mind some textbook "social welfare
function." No doubt the principles applied might often be of a more
commonsense sort. Most importantly, the official might as a matter
of course take the money values of marketable goods sacrificed or
added as measures of social costs and returns. On the other hand,
even such an approach necessarily is treacherous. What, for example,
if the prices at which goods and services are valued are generated in
a ration system rather than through an open market? One might
easily go astray at this point. Tentativeness might also be carried
331DECISION-MAKING IN TAXATION AND EXPENDITURES
too far. Presumably, however novel they may be, choice situations
always are in some degree repetitive. Indeed, one wonders whether
the question of whether the individual is rational can fruitfully be
discussed in any other context. At the same time, so far as there are
repetitive elements, are we not compelled to suppose some limi-
tations, given rationality, on the variability of values?
Professor Lindblom properly assumes that in welfare economics
rational decision-making is ordinarily seen as proceeding within
a "means-end framework." Although he is not entirely explicit,
one gathers that this is not necessarily so in the case of the "incre-
mental method." The view that must be taken here of this aspect
I believe is already sufficiently evident and needs no further elabora-
tion.
Professor Lindblom is certainly right in contending that disagree-
ment on values poses a difficulty for rational governmental decision-
making of a sort that welfare economists usually envisage. He feels,
however, that the difficulty consists in the fact that "government
decision-makers are often without clearly defined policy objectives."
.1 wonder whether it might not be somewhat more accurate to say
rather that in implementing his own values the official is subject to
complex political constraints posed by other people's. In any case,
it is not easy to see how the difficulty is disposed of, as is contended,
by use of the "incremental method." As Professor Lindblom is
aware, disagreements persist even within the politically relevant
range. As he contends, individuals can often agree on policies when
they disagree on principles, but as I have explained, a fairly extensive
commitment to principles hardly can be avoided. Possibly he is,
nevertheless, right in assuming as he apparently does that economics
textbooks stress insufficiently the implicit and tentative nature of
valuations: Possibly, too, as he seems to assume also, this has tended
to exacerbate disagreements among decision-makers, but I believe
this is a problem that is more properly considered under the sociology
of politics than in an inquiry into the conditions for rational decision-
making.
Professor Lindblom feels that as envisaged by the incremental
decision-maker, the problem of governmental decision-making is
much simplified in comparison with the usual conception. This
arises partly from the concentration on a limited range of alternatives
that are relevant. I believe it also arises partly from the different
conception of the valuation process. I have also said all that I
332DECISiON-MAKING IN TAXATION AND EXPENDITURES
have to say on these two aspects. On the other hand, the simplifi-
cation seemingly also is achieved because of the conscious decision
to focus on only "a small number out of all of the important relevant
values." This feature has not been commented on previously, and
I think I should at least record briefly some mixed feelings on this
score. Professor Lindblom's main concern at this point, I believe,
is simply to underline the familiar fact that consequences neglected
by one decision-maker may be considered by another. Hence the
whole decision-making process may be rational even though in-
dividual decisions are not. I agree that in a fully realistic formulation
of rationality one must consider the costs of acquiring and utilizing
information on alternatives. One wonders, however, whether the
official who neglects important aspects on the ground that they would
be properly weighed in the decision-making process as a whole
might not often be disappointed.
At the outset of his essay, Professor Lindblom informs us that
"most of what I have to say will be positive not normative." In
my opinion, the analysis of rationality on the part of public officials
is apt to be more fruitful in a normative than in a positive context,
but I do not undertake to consider here the question that is posed
as to the extent to which government decision-making in practice
can be understood as rational. On the other hand, in commenting
so far I have sought to do so without violating Professor Lindblom's
declared aim. It may be in order at this point, therefore; to consider
to what extent one's view of the problem he discusses might be
affected if one adopts a normative rather than positive standpoint.
A review from this standpoint is the more in order since the
"conventional principles" he describes were elaborated primarily
in a normative rather than positive context. Moreover, despite his
initial declaration of purpose, Professor Lindblom himself is clearly
much concerned with normative aspects.
Taking a normative standpoint, then, what is to be said of the
usual presuppositions regarding the nature of rational decision-
making and of the "incremental method" as an alternative? I
believe essentially all that has been said already still applies. On
the other hand, given a normative standpoint, the concern on a
theoretical plane presumably is to formulate general precepts that
might guide public officials. For this purpose, it seems all the more
difficult to see the merit in the avoidance of prior and explicit
commitment to values which Professor Lindblom stresses. In, ways
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that cannot be explored here I believe the problem posed by dis-
agreements in values is also somewhat altered when the analysis
proceeds in a normative context.
GERHARD COLM, National Planning Association
Lindblom has made a very significant, contribution to a realistic
analysis of the decision-making process in public policy determina-
tion. I would like to comment on one aspect of his "Coordination
Through Partisan Mutual Adjustment." I would be concerned if
the various means of coordination were to be understood as (1)
exhaustive and (2) normative. Perhaps he did not mean it that way.
However, it appears to me that a very important aspect has been
left out of his discussion. What I am concerned with is the concept
which may be called the general interest or the general welfare to use
terms of the "conventional norm." I suggest that this concept has
and should still have a crucial place in the analysis of the decision-
making process of public policy.
I emphasize the role of the general interest also because it has no
adequate place in the theoretical framework suggested by Musgrave
and Tiebout. The welfare approach looks at the benefit derived from
public services as in principle analogous to the benefits derived from
private goods. In this respect the welfare economists and the partisan
strategists are similar. Only Lindblom does not refer exclusively to
the welfare of individuals but also to individuals as members of a
partisan group.
It can of course always be said that the interest of the individual
or the interest of a partisan group includes the satisfaction they expect
to derive from seeing the general interest pursued by policies of the
government. This argument of the old hedonists is of course not
logically wrong but it omits the distinctions which are essential
if a theory of public finance is designed to 'analyze the peculiarities
and interactions of the public and the private sectors of the economy.
Also the spillover effect in its geographic or interpersonal meaning
cannot substitute for the concept of the general interest without
again stretching the meaning of that term. I wonder particularly how
the individuals of generations still unborn can express their preferences
with respect to programs which will have a spillover effect on them.
It is useful to distinguish between the market process and the
budget process. In the first, individuals or corporations pursue their
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self-interest within certain limits and the general interest presumably
is taken care of as a resul.t of the interplay of all the individuals and
corporations pursuing their self-interest. It is a basic problem of the
theory of public finance to explain why under certain conditions and
with respect to certain activities this coordination through the
market does not work or does not reach the desired results. This,
then, forms the basis for a rationale of government action.
I do not deny, of course, that the individual voter or the partisan
group are pursuing their self-interest also in their political activities.
With respect to some government activities (for instance, building
a sewer in a certain Street) the individual interest is decisive and
arguments that this activity is in the general interest would not be of
major importance. In some cases it may be possible that, as Lindblom
suggests, one partisan group may appeal to the partisan interest of
another group in order to form an alliance. For other government
activities, particularly those at the national level, but also many of
those at the state and local level, the "strategic coordination"
requires that those in favor of government action argue for the
proposed measure in terms of the general interest. In a pluralistic
society this might often be the only way to find support of individuals
and groups which have different or indifferent personal interests
with regard to a specific issue. Important as particular interests are
in the determination of public policies, they do not provide a work-
able criterion for the appraisal of many programs. For purposes of
policy appraisals the general interest must be translated into tangible
national objectives, such as economic growth, national security,
stability, resource development, opportunities, and so on.
If I buy a refrigerator, I do not argue with the dealer that lowering
his price or giving me a better quality product not only serves me
better, but also is in the interest of economic growth, economic
stability, national defense, or other objectives which may reflect
my concept of the general interest. On the other hand, if I am in
favor of an increase in defense expenditures it would not be very
effective if I argued that I am for this increase in expenditures because
it adds to my business (if I happen to be in the defense business);
or because I happen to live in an exposed part of the country; nor
would it be very effective if I argue for a reduction in the top-bracket
rate of the income tax only with the reason that I happen to be in that
bracket and prefer to pay less taxes. Thereby I hardly would find the
support of the people in the lower brackets without whose consent
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such tax reform could not be adopted. In the market mechanism,
everyone pursues his self-interest and the general interest is taken
care of as a result of these interactions. In contrast, the process of
democratic policy determination also requires that the individual
or the partisan group reconcile in their own thinking their particular
interests with the general interest.
Some people will be inclined to dismiss such reconciliation as mere
ideological "rationalization." I think it is one of the tasks of a
science of public finance to either "debunk" or to confirm the
claims made by advocates of various government measures.
I do not underestimate the difficulties involved in the concept of
the general interest or the general welfare. Every individual's and
every partisan group's concept of the general interest is influenced
by their position in society and their special interests among other
factors. What is adjusted in the process of "partisan coordination"
is to a large extent not merely differences in various personal wants
but differences in the concepts of the general interest or, we may also
say, differences in the image of good government.
The economist analyzing various policy proposals in terms of the
general interest will have to recognize not only the common ground
but also the differences in the hierarchy of values reflected in different
articulations of the general interest. The fact that a concept poses
difficulties which result from the pluralistic character of our society
is no reason for dropping such a concept, as long as it is essential. You
would not leave the role of Hamlet out of a performance of Hamlet
because there are several competing interpretations of his character.
In the theoretical discussion, reference was made to the "rational"
decision based on self-interest and the emotional and ideological
motivations which appear to spoil this neat process of decision-
making. (Or rather: a neat but purely formal expression of decision-
making.) If I vote for an issue of a school bond but have no children
in school and no direct interest in schools, this theory will make me
appear as irrational. I wonder whether it is really true that a person
who votes in line with his concept of the general interest to the best
of his lights, is really as "queer" as this theoretical approach makes
him out to be. Or might it be that this theoretical approach is too
narrow for grasping all aspects of decision-making in government
policy and for serving as a general theoretical frame of reference for
a theory of public finance? I am inclined to think that the latter is
the case.
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